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This dissertation focuses on how an information-enabled (i.e. there is free flow of 
demand information from the retailer to the supplier) supply chain utilizes the 
information about retailer behavior. By understanding, quantifying, and incorporating 
retailer behavior into the supplier’s decision making process, we can significantly 
improve supplier performance and in some cases, the total supply chain performance 
as well. The three chapters in this dissertation each deal with a different aspect of 
retailer behavior and thus result in models that are unique. In each case, a rigorous 
mathematical analysis coupled with an extensive numerical study enables us to 
characterize useful managerial insights. 
 
The first chapter analyzes a supplier’s inventory-control mechanism and its resulting 
impact on total supply chain cost using knowledge of the retailer inventory policy and 
the availability of real-time demand information. When the retailer uses the locally 
optimal (s,S) policy, there is randomness in order time and order quantity to the 
supplier whereas the supplier sees randomness only in order quantity for the locally 
suboptimal (R,T) policy and only in order time for another locally suboptimal (Q,r) 
policy. We find that the suboptimal policies perform better in most cases from the total 
supply chain perspective.  
 
 The second chapter examines when errors occur during a retailer’s information 
processing. By incorporating knowledge about the presence of these additive errors 
into an information-sharing model, we analyze how they affect the supply-chain cost. 
We observe that the detrimental impact of errors outweighs the beneficial impact of 
information sharing when the variance of errors exceeds the variance of end-customer 
demands. We further present an analytical model for determining the optimal level of 
investment to reduce information errors.  
 
The third chapter studies how a supplier, with retailers behaving as human 
newsvendors, can reduce inventory costs by quantifying and incorporating the 
retailers’ behavioral tendencies such as mean-anchoring and/or demand-chasing into 
the decision making processes. We develop mathematical models to estimate each 
retailer’s order quantity in the presence of these behavioral tendencies. We observe 
that the supplier’s inventory costs can be reduced significantly by considering this 
aspect of retailer behavior.  
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1 
CHAPTER 1 
RETAILER POLICY, UNCERTAINTY REDUCTION,  
AND SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In this information age, competition for businesses is fierce, and firms cannot stay 
competitive by focusing solely on their individual profits. The emphasis must be on 
the performance of the whole supply chain. The supply chain that meets the ever-
changing customer needs in a timely manner at a lower cost will eventually be 
dominant. Researchers have argued that sharing information with other members in 
the supply chain is a way to achieve and maintain this competitive edge. Specifically, 
as explained in Lee et al. (1997) and Chen et al. (1999), sharing demand information 
among supply chain members lessens the bullwhip effect (a phenomenon in which 
distorted demand information leads to amplified upstream order variability), which is 
one of the major causes of supply chain inefficiency. Lee et al. (2000) showed how a 
manufacturer in a two-stage supply chain can reduce inventory and lower costs when 
the retailer provides the end-customer demand information. These savings due to 
information sharing can vary quite a bit depending on the supply chain structure, 
parameters, and operating policies (See Gavirneni et al. (1999), Gavirneni (2002) and 
the references therein). 
Considering that the cooperative efforts such as information sharing aim for the 
total supply chain performance, and not just for individual profits; it is an important 
challenge to look for a desirable supply chain configuration that meets this purpose. In 
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this chapter, we seek desirable retailer inventory replenishment policies for a supply 
chain. Which inventory policies are more conducive to information sharing? In fact, 
inventory policies have drawn the attention of other researchers as well though their 
focuses are different from ours. Kull and Closs (2008) pointed out that the inventory 
policy parameters are one of the components that can be changed to achieve supply 
chain improvement. Moses and Seshadri (2000) explored policy mechanisms that are 
simultaneously beneficial to the supplier and the retailer. Kelle and Milne (1999) 
investigated how the parameters of an (s,S) policy influence the variability of the 
retailer orders. Our research investigates how changing the operating policies in a 
supply chain improves the benefit of information sharing and provides an insight 
about the possibility that locally suboptimal policies may be advantageous to make the 
best use of information flows. 
For a two-stage serial supply chain under periodic review, three well-known retailer 
inventory policies are considered: An (s,S) policy, an (R,T) policy, and a (Q,r) policy. 
If a retailer adopts an (s,S) policy, she orders up to S whenever her inventory level 
reaches or falls below s. On the other hand, if a retailer uses an (R,T) policy, she 
orders up to R every Tth period. Finally, if a retailer follows a (Q,r) policy, she orders 
the fixed amount of Q whenever her inventory level reaches or falls below r. Scarf 
(1960) proved that the (s,S) policy is optimal for a retailer under periodic inventory 
review when there is a fixed setup cost at the retailer. In such a case, it is interesting to 
review the motivation for comparing the optimal (s,S) policy to the locally suboptimal 
(R,T) or (Q,r) policies. Notice that when the retailer follows an (s,S) policy, the 
supplier faces randomness in order time as well as order quantity. However, the 
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supplier sees randomness (probably larger than the one in the (s,S) setting) only in 
order quantity when the retailer uses an (R,T) policy and only in order time when the 
retailer uses a (Q,r) policy. Therefore, by comparing these three circumstances, we 
obtain some knowledge about how the entire supply chain costs are affected in terms 
of uncertainty. The basic idea is to study whether the supplier’s savings from reduced 
uncertainty may exceed the retailer’s loss from using a suboptimal policy. The answer 
is not obvious and has implications on which policy is better for the entire supply 
chain to pursue in the presence of information sharing.  
The efforts to improve a supply chain by reducing uncertainties have been 
attempted in many papers. For example, Chiderhouse and Towill (2004) analyze how 
the uncertainty reduction correlates with the supply chain performance by classifying 
the sources of uncertainty into four categories: process side, supply side, demand side, 
and control side. In fact, information sharing is also one of the uncertainty reduction 
efforts because it aims for reducing demand uncertainty faced by the supplier (demand 
side). An (R,T) policy can be said to target more reliable shipment by reducing 
uncertainty in order time (process side) and a (Q,r) policy aims to reduce uncertainty 
in order quantity to the supplier (supply side). Many other papers also identify the 
sources of uncertainty and emphasize that supply chain management should be 
concerned with uncertainty reduction to improve the performance of the chain, 
theoretically (Chopra and Sodhi (2004), Christopher and Lee (2004), Ganguly and 
Guin (2007), etc.) or by case studies (Van der Vorst et al. (1998), Boyle et al. (2008)). 
This study is different from those existing papers as its focus lies in inventory control, 
specifically studying how changing the retailer inventory policy can reduce 
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uncertainties faced by the supplier which in turn affects total supply chain costs with 
or without information sharing. 
Using a two-stage serial supply chain (with a fixed ordering cost at the retailer) as 
our basic setting, we address the following issues: (i) what is the structure of optimal 
policies for the supplier under the retailer’s different inventory policies? (ii) which 
policy at the retailer will be better for the entire supply chain? and (iii) what parameter 
settings play a key role in making the suboptimal policies more beneficial for a supply 
chain? It is expected that answering these research questions will help to generate 
managerial suggestions on when and how to reduce uncertainties in inventory 
management for a supply chain in practice. 
By undertaking extensive computational experiments, we find that, in most cases, it 
is better for the retailer to use (R,T) or (Q,r) policies than to use the locally optimal 
(s,S) policy for the sake of the total supply chain. The benefit from using suboptimal 
policies is magnified when the retailer costs are low, when the supplier costs are high, 
and when there is information sharing. An (R,T) policy is more effective for lower 
demand variability while a (Q,r) policy is more effective for higher demand variability. 
In addition, we analyze the behavior of the benefit from information sharing under the 
three policies. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we introduce the 
supply chain setup with the models analyzed in this chapter. Section 1.3 explains our 
computational study and analyzes the benefit of using suboptimal policies instead of 
the locally optimal (s,S) policy from the total supply chain perspective. Section 1.4 
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presents the value of information sharing under different policies. In Section 1.5, the 
effect of capacity and the cases of more demand distributions are studied as extensions. 
We conclude in Section 1.6 by summarizing our discussions and identifying some 
directions for future research. 
1.2. Models 
There are hundreds of papers about information sharing and inventory control in a 
supply chain addressing various kinds of supply chain settings (See de Kok and 
Graves (2003)). The models, assumptions, and research methodology in this study 
follow the lines of Gavirneni et al. (1999) and Gavirneni (2002). We study a two-stage 
serial supply chain composed of one retailer and one supplier. The supplier produces 
the items which a retailer orders from him and sells to the end-customers with i.i.d. 
random demands. There is a fixed ordering cost (K) at the retailer along with unit 
holding cost (hr) for excess inventory and unit penalty cost (pr) for backlogged 
demands. The supplier incurs unit holding cost (hs) for excess inventory and unit 
expediting cost (ps) for the retailer demand that he cannot satisfy from on-hand 
inventory. We assume, like Lee et al. (1999), that the supplier uses an expediting 
process, incurring additional cost to provide the product demanded by the retailer as 
quickly as possible. There is infinite production capacity at the supplier.  
The sequence of events is following. (1) The supplier decides his production 
quantity for a period. The product is available immediately at his location. (2) The 
end-customer demand is realized for the period at the retailer. (3) After fully or 
partially satisfying the demand, the retailer either places an order or does nothing, 
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according to her inventory replenishment policy. (4) If the retailer places an order, the 
complete shipment (because, if needed, the supplier expedites) arrives at the beginning 
of the next period. (5) At the end of each period, the holding or penalty costs are 
calculated in accordance with the inventory levels. The fixed cost is calculated at the 
end of the period when the order is placed. 
 
Figure 1.1: Models with different retailer policies 
With this setup, we compare the supply chain costs under different policies. Note that 
the performance measure in this study is the total supply chain cost, not the individual 
(the retailer or the supplier) costs, to observe the plausible superiority of locally 
suboptimal policies. Figure 1.1 shows a brief description of the six models we analyze 
in this study. In the model names, NI refers to “no information sharing” while IS refers 
to “information sharing.” Information in this context refers to the real-time 
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information about end-customer demand up until the previous period provided to the 
supplier by the retailer. 
1.2.1. Model NI_sS and Model IS_sS 
In Model NI_sS and Model IS_sS, the retailer uses the optimal (s,S) policy. It is a 
reasonable assumption that the supplier figures out the retailer’s (s,S) policy and 
pursues his own optimal replenishment schemes. 
The analysis of these two models is well-documented in Gavirneni et al. (1999). 
They proved that the supplier’s optimal policy in both Model NI_sS and Model IS_sS 
is a state-dependent order-up-to policy. The state is defined as the number of periods 
since last order from the retailer for Model NI_sS and as the total end-customer 
demand seen by the retailer since last order for Model IS_sS. At the beginning of each 
period, the supplier observes the state and decides his order quantity to make the 
inventory level reach the optimal order-up-to level for that state. The optimal order-
up-to levels can be found by using an IPA (Infinitesimal Perturbation Analysis) 
procedure. They also established that for the supplier the cost function is convex and 
the order-up-to levels are non-decreasing in state. These properties are valid for both 
Model NI_sS and Model IS_sS. 
As a result of comparing Model NI_sS and Model IS_sS, they found that 
information is always beneficial. The savings from information sharing ranged from 
1% to 35% with an average of 14%. In addition, they observed the following 
phenomena: (1) information benefits are highest for moderate ratios of penalty cost to 
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holding cost; (2) information is most beneficial at moderate values of end-customer 
demand variance; and (3) information is most valuable for moderate value of (S-s). 
1.2.2. Model NI_RT and Model IS_RT  
Using similar arguments as in the previous subsection, it can be shown that the 
supplier’s optimal policy for Model NI_RT is a state-dependent order up-to policy as 
well. The state for Model NI_RT can be defined as the number of periods since last 
order, the same as in Model NI_sS. This is even simpler because the supplier has to 
observe the state only at the ordering epoch, once every Tth period. At the beginning of 
each period, the supplier knows whether or not the retailer is going to place an order in 
that period. With this information, the supplier decides the order quantity to minimize 
his expected holding and expediting costs. The resulting inventory control problem 
can be formulated as follows.  
t = the index of the period when there are t remaining periods 
tx = the starting inventory in period t 


t
t
yt periodinretailerthefromorder1
periodinretailerthefromorderno0
 
tz = the order up-to level in period t 
tD = the end-customer demand in period t 
)(F = the distribution of the end-customer demand 
tR = the retailer demand in period t 
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By defining a mega-period as T consecutive periods, the cost function of one mega-
period u is: 
])()([)(   uusuusRu zRpRzThEzC u . 
The order-up-to level that minimizes this cost function is the newsvendor solution,  
)(1
ss
s
T pTh
pF 
 , where TF  is the T
th convolution of the end-customer demand 
distribution since the retailer demand for every Tth period is the sum of the end-
customer demand over T periods. 
Similarly to Model NI_RT, the supplier’s inventory control problem for Model 
IS_RT can be formulated as follows with the state defined as the total end-customer 
demand seen by the retailer since last order. 
t = the cumulative end-customer demand, in period t, realized at the retailer since her 
last order 
),,( tttt yxV  = the supplier cost of the remaining t periods 
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The supplier’s optimal order up-to level can be computed, using newsvendor 
methodology, as )(1
ss
s
t pTh
pF 
 . Notice that the critical fractile is applied 
directly to the end-customer demand distribution and not its convolution because there 
is uncertainty only in one-period demand. 
Unlike the case under an (s,S) policy, we are able to analytically characterize the 
benefit of information sharing under an (R,T) policy if we suppose the end customer 
demand is normally distributed with mean   and variance 2 . The supplier’s optimal 
order-up-to levels can be restated as 
 TzT
pTh
pF
ss
s
T 
 )(1    for Model NI_RT ; and 
 z
pTh
pF t
ss
s
t 
 )(1   for Model IS_RT 
where 





ss
s
pTh
pz 1 . By Hadley and Whitin (1963), the cost of using this base 
stock policy can be calculated as: 
)()(1 zpThTC ssTNI   , 
)()(1 zpThC ssTIS    
where  NIC = the supplier cost of Model NI_RT, and 
       ISC = the supplier cost of Model IS_RT. 
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The supplier cost of Model IS_RT is always lower (better) than that of Model NI_RT. 
Therefore, sharing demand information is always beneficial to the supplier when the 
retailer uses an (R,T) policy. Additionally, we can observe that the relative cost benefit 
to the supplier increases as the order time T increases and is independent of demand 
variance. 
1.2.3. Model NI_Qr and Model IS_Qr 
When the retailer uses a (Q,r) inventory policy, the supplier will observe that the 
retailer orders either the fixed amount Q or nothing. To pursue the supplier’s optimal 
inventory control we define a state for Model NI_Qr as 
 i  the number of periods that have elapsed since last order. 
Suppose ip  denotes the probability that the retailer will place an order after i  periods. 
Then the retailer order, iR , faced by the supplier for each state i  is either Q  with 
probability ip  or 0  with probability  ip1 . Note that 1 ii pp . The optimization 
problem to calculate the supplier’s order-up-to level iz  can be expressed as 
    ][min   iisiisR zRpRzhE i   for each state i . 
As a result, the supplier’s optimal order-up-to level for each state is calculated as 
follows:   





ss
s
i
ss
s
i
i
ph
hp
ph
hpQ
z
 if0
 if
. 
12 
For Model IS_Qr, we define a new state i  as 
i  the retailer’s inventory level observed by the supplier. 
As the supplier gains the demand information provided by the retailer, he can detect 
the retailer’s inventory level each period. In this case, let ip  denote the probability 
that the retailer will place an order when the retailer’s inventory level is i . That is, 
 riDp ii  Pr , and it is shown that 1 ii pp . 
Similarly to Model NI_Qr, the supplier’s optimal order-up-to level for Model IS_Qr is 
calculated as follows: 








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

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r
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pFiQ
z
ss
s
ss
s
i
1
1
 if0
 if
 
where  .F  is the demand distribution function. 
  The benefit of information sharing under a (Q,r) policy that can be evaluated by 
comparing Model NI_Qr and Model IS_Qr will be detailed in Section 1.4 through a 
computational study. 
1.3. Benefit of uncertainty reduction 
Based on the structures of inventory policies established in Section 1.2, we want to 
perform, using an extensive numerical study, a rigorous investigation into how various 
supply chain parameters affect the possible benefit of suboptimal (R,T) and (Q,r) 
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policies over an (s,S) policy. Because of the difficulty in obtaining the costs 
(especially for (s,S) and (Q,r) policies) analytically, the supply chain behavior can 
only be observed via simulation.  
Infinitesimal Perturbation Analysis (IPA) is used to find the optimal (R,T) values 
for the retailer and the optimal order up-to levels for the supplier. (Refer to 
Glasserman and Tayur (1995) for more details on the IPA procedure.) To find the 
optimal (s,S) values for the retailer, we use the algorithm developed by Zheng and 
Federgruen (1991). To compute the optimal (R,T) values for the retailer, we first 
determine the optimal value of R given T (Rao (2003)). By comparing the cost of each 
(R,T) policy for different values of T, we acquire the optimal (R,T) values. For (Q,r) 
cases, we develop a program to find optimal (Q,r) values with initial values Q = S – s 
and r = s. For (s,S) and (R,T) models, the above-mentioned IPA procedure is used to 
compute the supplier’s order-up-to levels and for (Q,r) models, the supplier’s order-
up-to level is either Q or 0.  
The goal of this computational study is to compare the supply chain costs under 
different policies in order to explore the role of uncertainty reduction with or without 
information sharing. Remember that the performance measure is the entire supply 
chain cost, but neither the retailer cost nor the supplier cost. The number of the 
simulated periods is 1,000,000 times the optimal T value, which we found is enough 
to guarantee infinite-horizon average costs. 
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1.3.1. Computational setup 
The simulation experiments were conducted with the following parameters which 
constitute 625 combinations for each demand distribution: rh 1 for all the 
experiments; rp {3,5,7,9,11}; sh {0.5,0.7,0.9,1.1,1.3}; sp {3,5,7,9,11}; and 
K {30,50,70,90,110}. We consider three demand distributions: Erlang (2,10), 
Erlang (4,5), and Erlang (8, 2.5). Erlang distributions are selected as they generate 
non-negative demands and enable us to compare demand distributions with the same 
mean (20) but various levels of uncertainty: cv (coefficient of variation) of Erlang 
(2,10) = 0.71; cv of Erlang (4,5) = 0.5; and cv of Erlang (8,2.5) = 0.35. 
Random examples are taken to show how the numerical study works: 
Example 1: Erlang (2,10), rh 1, rp 5, sh 0.7, sp 11, K 50. 
Example 2: Erlang (4,5), rh 1, rp 7, sh 1.3, sp 5, K 90. 
Table 1.1. Cost data of two examples 
 
Example NI_sS NI_RT NI_Qr 
RC  SC  SCC RC  SC  SCC RC  SC  SCC
1 49.89 38.80 88.69 59.50 27.93 87.43 51.99 23.28 75.27
2 61.28 35.00 96.28 69.17 20.74 89.91 62.50 32.25 94.75
Example IS_sS IS_RT IS_Qr 
RC  SC  SCC RC  SC  SCC RC  SC  SCC
1 49.89 37.12 87.01 59.50 20.62 80.12 51.99 22.91 74.90
2 61.28 27.57 88.85 69.17 11.66 80.83 62.50 19.87 82.37
Note: RC = the retailer cost, SC = the supplier cost, SCC = the total supply chain cost 
Table 1.1 illustrates the detailed cost data for these examples. As expected, (s,S) 
models have the lowest retailer cost because an (s,S) policy is optimal for the retailer 
15 
and the supplier costs of (R,T) and (Q,r) models are lower than that of (s,S) models as 
the supplier faces less uncertainty in order time or in order quantity. However, we 
cannot say which models are always superior to other models since the rank of the 
total supply chain cost varies depending on demand distribution, cost parameters, and 
availability of information. Another observation is that the supplier benefits from 
information sharing. 
1.3.2. Results and implications 
The computational setup generates a total of 1875 cases. When there is no information 
sharing, the supply chain cost of (R,T) model is smaller than that of (s,S) model in 
76.48% of the cases and the supply chain cost of (Q,r) model is smaller than that of 
(s,S) model in 85.23% of the cases. When there is information sharing, the benefit of 
the retailer using suboptimal policies to reduce uncertainty faced by the supplier is 
more pronounced: in 94.08% of the cases, the supply chain cost of (R,T) model is 
smaller than that of (s,S) model; and in 99.73% of the cases, the supply chain cost of 
(Q,r) model is smaller than that of (s,S) model. Average percentage benefit gained by 
switching from an (s,S) policy to different policies is 3.86% for an (R,T) policy with 
no information sharing, 7.74% for an (R,T) policy with information sharing, 4.81% for 
a (Q,r) policy with no information sharing, and 8.02% for a (Q,r) policy with 
information sharing, respectively. 
It is noteworthy that (R,T) or (Q,r) policies perform better than the locally optimal 
(s,S) policy in most cases from the entire supply chain perspective. Obviously, the 
improvement is achieved by reducing uncertainty faced by the supplier. Under our 
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computational setting, while the average increase in retailer cost compared to an (s,S) 
policy is 12.68% for an (R,T) policy and 3.10% for a (Q,r) policy, the average saving 
in supplier cost compared to an (s,S) policy is 34.70% for an (R,T) policy with no 
information sharing, 52.42% for an (R,T) policy with information sharing, 18.63% for 
a (Q,r) policy with no information sharing, and 31.89% for a (Q,r) policy with 
information sharing. From these results, the uncertainty reduction in order time seems 
to benefit the supplier more effectively than the uncertainty reduction in order quantity, 
whereas an (R,T) policy is farther from optimal to the retailer than a (Q,r) policy. 
In the following, we plot the average benefit (% savings in total supply chain cost 
by retailer changing her current (s,S) policy to other policies) by fixing each parameter, 
in order to investigate the behavior of the benefit from the policy changes with respect 
to various parameters. We use the following notation to better illustrate our plots: 
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where NISsC ),(  the supply chain cost of Model NI_sS, IS SsC ),(  the supply chain cost 
of Model IS_sS, NI TRC ),(  the supply chain cost of Model NI_RT, IS TRC ),(  the supply 
chain cost of Model IS_RT, NI rQC ),(  the supply chain cost of Model NI_Qr, and 
IS rQC ),(  the supply chain cost of Model IS_Qr. 
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Figure 1.2: Average benefit from policy changes with respect to demand variability 
Figure 1.2 shows how the demand variability affects the benefit from the policy 
changes. Interestingly, an (R,T) policy is more beneficial to the supply chain when the 
end-customer demand is less variable, whereas a (Q,r) policy is more beneficial when 
the demand is more variable. This implies that the results could be quite different if we 
take a certain set of demand distributions: e.g. an (R,T) policy may be always superior 
to a (Q,r) policy if we only consider the demand distributions with very low variability. 
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Furthermore, this finding gives us an important insight about the relationship 
between the demand variability and the role of uncertainty reduction in inventory 
control. That is, when end-customer demands are highly variable, knowing the exact 
retailer order amount (if there is an order placement) helps the supplier more than 
knowing the retailer order frequency. On the other hand, when demand variability is 
low, the supplier’s knowledge of the retailer order frequency is more powerful. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
3 5 7 9 11
Retailer unit penalty cost
%
 B
en
ef
it
% (R,T) benefit (NI) % (R,T) benefit (IS)
% (Q,r) benefit (NI) % (Q,r) benefit (IS)
 
Figure 1.3: Average benefit from policy changes w.r.t. retailer unit penalty cost 
Figures 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5 show the increasing or decreasing tendency of the average 
benefit from policy changes with respect to cost parameters. As the retailer unit 
penalty cost increases, the advantage of using an (s,S) policy which is optimal to the 
retailer also increases relatively. Therefore, the benefit of using (R,T) or (Q,r) policies 
over an (s,S) policy is decreasing in the retailer-associated cost. Retailer’s using (R,T) 
or (Q,r) policies reduces the uncertainty faced by the supplier, thus reducing the 
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possibility of overstock or stockout at the supplier. Therefore, the relative benefit from 
the policy changes increases as the supplier-associated cost increases. 
 
Figure 1.4: Average benefit from policy changes w.r.t. supplier unit holding cost 
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Figure 1.5: Average benefit from policy changes w.r.t. supplier unit expediting cost 
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1.4. Value of information sharing 
By analyzing value of information sharing in this study’s setting, not only can we 
compare the value of information under different policies (three most well-known 
policies) but also it is possible to validate the accuracy of our computational study. 
The results about the value of information under an (s,S) policy are actually very 
similar to those in Gavirneni et al. (1999). Under our computational setting, 
information is always beneficial to the supplier for all three policies: the relative 
benefit (cost savings) from information sharing is, on average, 15.39% for an (s,S) 
policy, 38.19% for an (R,T) policy, and 27.98% for a (Q,r) policy, respectively. 
The following measures are defined to analyze the behavior of the benefit from 
information sharing: 
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Figure 1.6: Average benefit from information sharing w.r.t. demand variability 
 
Figure 1.6 plots average benefit from information sharing under each policy with 
respect to coefficient of variation of end customer demand. For (s,S) and (Q,r) policies, 
the average percentage benefit from information sharing decreases as demand 
variability increases. As Gavirneni et al. (1999) explained, when the variance is very 
high, the information to reduce demand uncertainty at the supplier is relatively not 
effective. On the other hand, the average percentage benefit from information sharing 
appears to be constant for an (R,T) policy, which is in line with the analytical property 
(Refer to Section 1.2.2.) that the relative value of information is independent of 
demand variability for normal demand distribution.  
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Figure 1.7: Average benefit from information sharing w.r.t. fixed cost 
 
Figure 1.7 shows that average benefit from information sharing is increasing in the 
fixed cost at the retailer under all three policies. As the fixed cost determines the order 
interval, these patterns are highly correlated with the order frequency. Remember that 
the value of information increases with the order time T under an (R,T) policy for 
normal demand distribution (Refer to Section 1.2.2.). Since the supplier obtains the 
information of realized demand for (T-1) periods, the relative benefit increases as the 
order time T increases. Also, for (s,S) and (Q,r) policies, higher fixed cost leads to 
longer average order interval, i.e. more uncertainty in order time, and so sharing 
demand information is relatively more effective. 
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Figure 1.8: Average benefit from info sharing w.r.t. ratio of penalty to holding cost 
Figure 1.8 illustrates the average benefit from information sharing with respect to ratio 
of the supplier unit penalty cost ( sp ) to the supplier unit holding cost ( sh ). As 
Gavirneni et al. (1999) stated, information would have very limited benefit if the ratio 
is close to 0 or is very large. Information is more beneficial for moderate ratios and the 
peak is reached at a small penalty for all three policies under our computational setting. 
1.5. Extensions 
In this section, several additional issues regarding the results are addressed. Relaxing 
some of our previous assumptions facilitates further understanding of how uncertainty 
reduction by changing a retailer policy affects the supply chain performance. 
Specifically, we discuss the effects of the supplier’s production capacity and various 
end-customer demand distributions.  
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1.5.1. Effect of capacity 
If there is a capacity limit on suppliers’ production, suppliers may need to stock up in 
advance to meet the retailer demand. This increases the supplier’s inventory costs: 
holding costs increase due to previously-produced stocks and penalty cost may 
increase due to insufficient inventory caused by a capacity limit. To see how the 
capacity restriction influences on the benefit of policy changes, we conduct additional 
experiments with the following computational setup:  K 30, rh 1, and Erlang (4,5) 
demand for all the experiments; rp {3,5,7,9,11}; sh {0.5,0.7,0.9,1.1,1.3}; 
sp {3,5,7,9,11}; and capacity limits = {20,30,40,50,60, 70}.  
Note that we only consider the cases of no information sharing because our primary 
interest lies in the effect of capacity, which is not related with information sharing. 
The results are described in Figure 1.9.  
 
Figure 1.9. Average benefit from policy changes w.r.t. supplier production capacity 
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It is not so surprising that the results of capacities over 60 are almost the same as those 
of infinite capacities, considering the values of (S-s) for an (s,S) policy range from 30 
to 32, the values of the supplier’s order-up-to levels for an (R,T) policy range from 
39.52 to 60.92, and the values of Q for a (Q,r) policy range from 32.22 to 49.91, which 
are determined by the given set of cost parameters. When the supplier’s production 
capacity is below 60, we observe that the average benefit that the supply chain gains 
from the retailer’s changing her inventory policy from an (s,S) policy to an (R,T) 
policy or a (Q,r) policy is smaller than that of a system where the supplier has infinite 
capacity. That is, the existence of a capacity limit lessens the advantage of uncertainty 
reduction to the supplier’s inventory control. Remember that when the supplier has an 
infinite production capacity, the retailer’s using an (R,T) policy enables the supplier to 
produce every T period instead of every period. It would save much of inventory 
holding costs compared to the capacitated system where the supplier may need to 
produce beforehand. Likewise, if the supplier’s production capacity is less than the 
value Q of a (Q,r) policy, the benefit of the supplier’s preparing for the exact retailer 
order amount decreases significantly. 
1.5.2. More demand distributions 
When the end-customer demands follow other types of distributions such as normal, 
uniform, or exponential distribution, do our results still hold? Here we consider three 
more distributions with the same mean 20 – Normal (20,32) truncated at 0, Uniform 
[10,30], and Exponential (20) – and conduct extensive simulation experiments with 
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the same combination of cost parameters as in Section 1.3. Let us assume there is 
information sharing between supply chain members. 
We find out that most of the previous results are valid for these demand 
distributions as well. First, the retailer’s using (R,T) or (Q,r) policies reduces 
uncertainty to the supplier, leading to the decrease in the supplier’s inventory cost. For 
the total supply chain cost, under Normal (20,32) demand distribution, an (R,T) policy 
performs better than an (s,S) policy in 100% of the cases with 17.34% cost reduction 
on average and a (Q,r) policy performs better than an (s,S) policy in 66.88% of the 
cases with 2.82% cost reduction on average. Under Uniform [10,30] demand 
distribution, an (R,T) policy performs better than an (s,S) policy in 96.96% of the 
cases with 4.81% cost reduction on average and a (Q,r) policy performs better than an 
(s,S) policy in 65.6% of the cases with 2.73% cost reduction on average. Under 
Exponential (20) demand distribution, an (R,T) policy performs better than an (s,S) 
policy in 76.32% of the cases with 5.17% cost reduction on average and a (Q,r) policy 
performs better than an (s,S) policy in 86.08% of the cases with 9.15% cost reduction 
on average. 
Second, the relationships between the average benefit (supply-chain cost decrease 
due to policy changes) and the cost parameters show the same patterns as the results in 
Section 1.3: The average relative benefit of policy changes decreases with the 
retailer’s unit holding cost ( rp ), increases with the supplier’s unit holding cost ( sh ), 
and increases with the supplier’s unit penalty cost ( sp ) under Normal (20,3
2), 
Uniform [10,30], and Exponential (20) demand distributions. 
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1.6. Conclusion 
This chapter studies the impact of a retailer’s inventory policy on the supply chain cost 
by comparing three well-known inventory policies: (s,S), (R,T), and (Q,r) policies. We 
establish the structure of the supplier’s optimal policies depending on the retailer’s 
inventory policy and the availability of demand information. As (R,T) and (Q,r) 
policies make the supplier face less uncertainty than an (s,S) policy, this study shows 
how the uncertainty reduction plays an important role in inventory control from a total 
supply chain perspective. 
The numerical results indicate that the retailer using (R,T) or (Q,r) policies is more 
beneficial to the entire supply chain than an (s,S) policy in most cases. The benefit 
from policy changes is magnified when the retailer-related cost is low or when the 
supplier-related cost is high. We can also observe that uncertainty reduction in order 
time by applying an (R,T) policy is more advantageous for lower demand variability 
and that uncertainty reduction in order quantity by applying a (Q,r) policy is more 
advantageous for higher demand variability. In addition, value of information sharing 
under different policies is analyzed. 
An academic contribution of this study is that the well-known three inventory 
policies are re-evaluated from the total supply chain viewpoint. The finding that the 
cost saving as a result of reducing uncertainties at the supplier often exceeds the loss 
to the retailer pursuing non-optimal behaviors is valuable as it is neither obvious nor 
intuitive at first glance. Further, it is interesting that these sub-optimal but more 
desirable policies are even easier to implement in practice than a locally optimal but 
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system-inferior (s,S) policy. If retailers use an (R,T) policy, they do not need to watch 
inventory levels every single period unlike those who use an (s,S) policy, leading to 
significant labor savings. For a (Q,r) policy, cost saving due to simplification of 
transportation is expected since the order amount is fixed. Therefore, the findings of 
this research also contribute to strategic implications that a change to suboptimal but 
more practical applications leads to a win-win solution for both retailers and suppliers. 
More interestingly, the benefit from policy changes is pronounced when there is 
information sharing. In other words, uncertainty reduction by changing the retailer 
policy is one way to enhance the benefit from information sharing. It is an open 
question what is the best supply chain configuration for information sharing under a 
certain setting; according to our study, uncertainty reduction will be one of the 
approaches toward the answer. Future study should explore any other possible 
approaches. 
Identifying an incentive scheme to convince retailers to pursue the proposed sub-
optimal policies is another issue worthy of future research. Because only the supplier 
benefits from the policy changes or from information sharing, we need to find ways to 
encourage retailers to participate in such efforts for supply chain improvement. Many 
papers devised means to induce retailers to take part in information sharing. For 
example, Lee and Whang (1999) study alternative performance mechanisms to align 
incentives. Yu et al. (2002) propose a strategic partnership between supply chain 
members by adopting vendor managed inventory (VMI). Likewise, some strategies 
give retailers incentives to pursue locally suboptimal strategies or supplier can 
compensate the retailers, possibly via side payments. Any supply chain improvement 
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endeavors require trust and cooperation between supply chain partners. To search for 
the methods to attract supply chain cooperation will be another subject that merits 
future study. 
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CHAPTER 2 
IMPACT OF INFORMATION ERRORS  
ON SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Information sharing in supply chains has been a popular research topic and its benefits 
have been well documented (Chen (1998), Gavirneni et al. (1999), Lee et al. (2000), 
Chen et al. (2000), Cachon and Fisher (2000), etc.). All these papers have assumed 
that the shared information is precise and error-free, which, of course, is not true in 
practice. Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems are known to contain errors that 
are introduced when inventory recording processes are not followed correctly. 
Stedman (1998) described the case of a dental equipment maker regarding how those 
errors can cause problems as follows: incorrect bills of material that were entered for 
production uses were passed along to inventory managers and left them to believe that 
the company had more materials than it actually did. In fact, many articles (Stein 
(1999), Nelson (2002), Umble et al. (2003), Basoglu et al. (2007), etc.) identified 
information inaccuracy as one of the main reasons for failure of ERP systems. Xu et al. 
(2002) also underscored the importance of data accuracy in ERP execution by 
illustrating case studies of two Australian organizations doing SAP projects. As it is 
usually very expensive to implement ERP systems (Scapens et al. (1998)), it is 
necessary to ensure their successful implementation. Understanding the impact of 
information inaccuracy on supply chain performance and ensuring that errors do not 
lead to a failure must be an important step in any ERP implantation.  
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The extant research in this area has documented that information errors often 
originate from retailers. For example, mis-scanning of items, restocking errors or theft 
may distort inventory information (Raman et al. (2001), BearingPoint (2002), 
DeHoratius and Raman (2008)). These errors are eventually transmitted to the supplier 
and impact his inventory management as well, especially if the supplier is not aware of 
the presence of these errors. The problem of inventory record inaccuracy at retailers is 
prevalent and empirical evidence suggests that more than 50% of inventory records 
are not correct (Raman et al. (2001), Kang and Gershwin (2005)). DeHoratius and 
Raman (2008) identified several factors that influence record inaccuracy and 
emphasized the need to incorporate error characteristics into robust planning models. 
They pointed out that inventory record inaccuracy affects not only the operational 
performance of retailers but also the performance of upstream supply chain partners. 
Kök and Shang (2007) also considered inventory record inaccuracy issues in inventory 
management and provided an optimal joint inspection and replenishment policy when 
the inventory records were inaccurate. In this chapter, we study the impact of 
inaccurate information provided by the retailer on the supplier’s cost. Suppose 
inaccurate demand information at the retailer caused by mis-scanning or theft is 
provided to the supplier via point-of-sales system and then the retailer corrects her 
inventory status and places an order for only as much as she needs while the supplier 
has already made his inventory decision based on false information. In this case, will 
information sharing still be beneficial to the supplier? If the loss due to errors is too 
big, it may be better for suppliers to ignore the demand information coming from 
retailers. Our main objective is to document conditions under which the supplier 
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should pursue such a strategy. 
Despite its importance, only a few papers have explored the impact of inaccurate 
information on the benefit of information sharing. Kök and Shang (2009) and 
Camdereli and Swaminathan (2010) studied the impact of inaccurate inventory records 
on supply chains and regarded Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) as a solution to 
eliminate the inaccuracy. On the other hand, we look into transaction errors from the 
information system such as RFID. Sari (2008) analyzed a four-echelon supply chain 
and concluded that inaccurate inventory information significantly influences the 
performance of collaboration initiatives and its impact under CPFR (collaborative 
planning, forecasting and replenishment) is bigger than that under VMI (vendor 
managed inventory). He observed that these practices are more sensitive to 
information errors when customer demand uncertainty is low and/or when lead times 
are short. Choi (2008) studied the impact of errors on the benefits of both upstream 
and downstream information sharing in supply chains with two stages. Our study is 
different from these studies in several aspects. First, we present a rigorous analytical 
model to capture information errors in supply chains, analyze the resulting 
optimization problems, and develop structural properties of the optimal solution. 
Further, we develop practicable guidelines for managing these systems. 
Specifically, we address the following questions: (i) As the magnitude of errors in 
shared information increases, how does the supply chain behave? (ii) How do supply 
chain parameters affect the impact of errors on reducing the benefit of information 
sharing? and (iii) How much should the supply chain invest in reducing the magnitude 
of errors? Our analytical and computational results indicate that the benefit of 
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information sharing decreases as the magnitude of errors increases and the information 
is no more useful when the variability of errors exceeds the variability of end-
customer demands. Demand variance, retailer order interval, and cost parameters 
affect the impact of information errors. The supply chain may make investments to 
reduce the magnitude of errors only when the cost reduction outweighs the investment, 
and this optimal investment is discussed. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The supply chain setup is 
introduced in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 presents the analytical results focusing on how 
information errors affect the benefit of information sharing and how various 
parameters influence the impact of information errors. In Section 2.4, the 
computational results are shown to enhance understanding on the behavior of 
information errors. The simulation method also enabled extensions to vary demand 
distributions. Section 2.5 provides instructions on how much one should invest in 
reducing information errors through an analysis of optimal investments. Finally, 
Section 2.6 concludes by addressing the managerial implications of our results. 
2.2. Supply chain setup 
We consider a serial supply chain composed of a single supplier and a single retailer, 
as has been done by many researchers in the past work. We describe all the 
assumptions regarding the retailer’s and the supplier’s ordering processes with their 
policy structures along with the end-customer demands faced by the retailer.  
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2.2.1. Models 
Here we introduce three models for analyzing the impact of information errors on 
supply chain performance. When there is no information sharing, the retailer faces i.i.d. 
end-customer demands and places an order with the supplier according to an (R,T) 
inventory replenishment policy (Model NI). When there is information sharing 
(without errors), not only does the retailer place an order with the supplier but also she 
provides correct information about real-time end-customer demands to the supplier 
(Model IS). Finally, when there is information sharing with errors, the demand 
information provided by the retailer contains errors (Model IE). Figure 2.1 shows a 
brief description of the three models.  
 
Figure 2.1: Models of information sharing with and without errors 
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While existing literatures focus on value of information sharing (which can be 
achieved by comparing Model NI and Model IS), our main objective is to examine the 
true value of information when there are errors by comparing Model NI and Model IE 
and scrutinize the impact of information errors by comparing Model IS and Model IE. 
Note that we assume the retailer uses an (R,T) policy. The (R,T) inventory policy 
refers to the system under which the retailer places an order with the supplier every 
T th period to bring her inventory level up to R . Optimal values of R  and T  are 
determined by minimizing the retailer’s cost which includes a fixed cost that occurs 
whenever the retailer places an order. There are two main reasons why we analyze the 
case of the retailer using an (R,T) policy. 
First, the (R,T) policy is often used in practice because it is relatively easy to 
implement. We usually observe that many retailers place an order and stock items on a 
regular basis such as on a specific day of the week or of the month, etc. Not only is the 
(R,T) policy widely used, but also it is more cost effective for the entire supply chain 
than a locally optimal (s,S) policy (Kwak and Gavirneni (2011)).  
Second, compared to the case where the retailer places an order with the supplier 
every period, the benefit of information sharing to the supplier seems much clearer. 
When there is no information sharing, the supplier just observes the retailer order 
every T th period. Thus, every T th period, the supplier faces the cumulative 
uncertainty associated with T  periods. When there is information sharing, the supplier 
has information on the realized demands for  1T  periods and faces demand 
uncertainty for only the T th period. This is how the shared information contributes to 
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the supplier’s cost savings by reducing demand uncertainties. For the scenario of 
information sharing with errors, we incorporate the error factors in the shared 
information (the information of the realized demands for  1T  periods). 
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The supplier decides his production 
quantity and the production is completed immediately. If there is information sharing, 
the production decision is based on the information provided by the retailer. If there 
are errors in the shared information, the supplier’s decision is based on false 
information though he recognizes the existence of errors. (2) The end-customer 
demand at the retailer is realized. The demand is fulfilled by the retailer’s available 
inventory and excess demand is backlogged. If there is information sharing, the 
retailer gives the supplier information about real-time end-customer demands through 
a system such as ERP. (3) The retailer places an order with the supplier if it is the time 
to order (every T th period) or does nothing otherwise. (4) The supplier ships the 
requested order quantity to the retailer. If the supplier does not have enough stock to 
satisfy this order, the shortfall is filled by a secondary source with ample supply, in 
which case the supplier incurs substantial penalty cost. Note that we adopt the 
“borrowed” assumption from Chen and Lee (2009) for analytical tractability. If 
backlog is not allowed for the supplier, exact analysis of his inventory problem is very 
hard. Chen and Lee (2009) discussed this simplifying assumption that the supplier can 
borrow the shortfall inventory from a secondary source and then return them after 
usage. (5) The goods shipped from the supplier arrive at the retailer.   
At the end of each period, the retailer incurs unit holding cost ( rh ) for excess 
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inventory and unit penalty cost ( rp ) for backlogged demands while the supplier incurs 
unit holding cost ( sh ) for excess inventory and unit penalty cost ( sp ) for retailer 
demand that he cannot satisfy from on-hand inventory. Since information sharing 
benefits only the supplier (Gavirneni et al. (1999), Lee et al. (2000), etc.), we evaluate 
and compare the supplier’s cost under different scenarios – no information sharing 
(Model NI), information sharing without errors (Model IS), and information sharing 
with errors (Model IE). The following notations are used for the supplier’s costs of the 
three models throughout the paper. 
 NIC = the supplier cost when there is no information sharing. 
 ISC = the supplier cost when there is information sharing without errors. 
 IEC = the supplier cost when there is information sharing with errors. 
It is clear that NIC  is larger than ISC  and that IEC  is larger than ISC . The key question 
we wish to study is when information sharing is no longer useful because of errors, i.e. 
when IEC  is larger than NIC . In order to evaluate these supplier costs, we first analyze 
the retailer ordering decision for i.i.d. normal end-customer demand distributions, and 
then analyze the supplier production decision with the retailer order quantity as the 
demand faced by the supplier. 
2.2.2. Ordering decisions 
We assume the i.i.d. end-customer demand is normally distributed with mean   and 
standard deviation  . That is, the demand for a period is given by ttD   , where 
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),0(Normal~ 2 t . It is a reasonable assumption that both the retailer and the 
supplier have the information about the distribution of future end-customer demands 
since savvy retailers and suppliers will use historical data to determine the distribution 
of the demands (Raghunathan (2001)).  
If u  is defined as a mega-period for T  periods, retailer’s order quantity is 
expressed as  
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Note that the retailer’s order quantity can be negative because of the normality 
assumption of t . As in Chen and Lee (2009), we allow for negative order quantity for 
ease of exposition and tractability. That is, the retailer can freely return excess 
inventory to the supplier. In addition, if the demand mean   is large enough, the 
chance of a negative order quantity is negligible. 
The supplier faces the retailer demand as uY  in every mega-period u . Therefore, in 
order to determine the supplier’s order up-to level uS  that minimizes the total 
expected holding and penalty costs in mega period u , the supplier needs to find the 
distribution of uY .   
When there is no information sharing (Model NI), we assume that the supplier only 
knows the expected retailer order quantity and its variance. Then, the supplier would 
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deal with uY  as having a normal distribution with mean T  and variance 2T . The 
supplier’s optimal order up-to level in this case is given by 
 TZTSu   where 





ss
s
pTh
pZ 1 . 
With information sharing (Model IS), the supplier knows not only the expected retailer 
order quantity but also 1)1(  Tu , 2)1(  Tu , …, )1()1(  TTu  from the information of 
realized demands for  1T  periods 1)1(  TuD , 2)1(  TuD , …, )1()1(  TTuD . Thus, if there 
are no errors in the shared information, the supplier handles uY  as having a normal 
distribution with mean 


1
1
)1(
T
i
iTuT   and variance 2 . The supplier’s optimal order 
up-to level in this case is given by 
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Now, suppose that there are errors in the information provided by the retailer (Model 
IE). We assume that the information errors t  are i.i.d. normally distributed with mean 
0 and standard deviation  . The normality assumption of information errors allows 
for the possibility that the information transmitted is negative which may not be 
suitable for some settings. However, the possibility of negative demand information is 
very low when the mean demand is large enough as we assumed before. We proceed 
with the normality assumption because it enables us to obtain stronger analytical 
results. In the simulation study detailed in Section 2.4, we are able to accommodate, 
via truncation, that the information is non-negative and we are pleased to report that 
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all the analytical results are still well supported.  
In this case, the supplier has to use the wrong information to decide his order-up-to 
level. However, since the supplier knows the demand distribution, it is highly possible 
that he realizes the existence of errors in the information. That is, a smart supplier will 
figure out the variability of information errors, 2 , given he assumes that the mean of 
errors is zero (Though DeHoratius and Raman (2008) demonstrated a bias in the errors 
of SKU-level data, the assumption of unbiased errors for our study is reasonable to 
pursue our objective to observe the impact of errors on benefit of information sharing 
since it is just a matter of parallel transference.), and optimize a part of his order-up-to 
level. Still, some loss due to errors is inevitable because the order-up-to level includes 
false information. Despite the supplier being aware that there exist errors in the 
information, he cannot just avoid information sharing because the erroneous 
information may still be more beneficial than no information.  
In the case of information sharing with errors, instead of 1)1(  Tu , 2)1(  Tu , …, 
)1()1(  TTu , the supplier knows 1)1(  Tu , 2)1(  Tu , …, )1()1(  TTu   where 
1)1(1)1(1)1(   TuTuTu  , …, )1()1()1()1()1()1(   TTuTTuTTu  . Thus, when 
there are errors in the information of the realized demands and the supplier knows the 
distribution of the errors, he treats uY  as having a normal distribution with mean 



1
1
)1(
T
i
iTuT   and variance 22 )1(   T . The supplier’s optimal order up-to level 
in this case is given by 
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2.3. Cost comparisons 
In this section, we determine the supplier’s costs for the three models described above 
and evaluate their behavior. The supplier’s long-run average cost is given by 
  uu YScET 
1  
where      0,max0,max xpxThxc ss  . 
The resulting costs of the three models are computed as follows: 
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The cost savings out of information sharing is calculated as  
     11  TZpTh
T
CC ssISNI  
if the information is totally error-free. However, if there are errors in the shared 
information (which is mostly probable), the actual cost savings will be 
      22 11   TTZpTh
T
CC ssIENI  
which generalizes the previous cost savings. This measure corresponds to the benefit 
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of information sharing gained by moving from the case of no information sharing to 
the case of information sharing with errors. 
Theorem 2.1 The supplier obtains no benefits from information sharing when the 
variability of information errors exceeds the variability of end-customer demands.  
Proof: Recall that the benefit of information sharing (savings in the supplier’s cost) is 
calculated as       22 11   TTZpTh
T
CC ssIENI .   
Information sharing will benefit the supplier when 0 IENI CC  and therefore, for 
information sharing to be beneficial,     22 11   TT , leading to 22   .        ■                           
Theorem 2.1 provides a useful rule of thumb for supply chain managers on the 
threshold magnitude of errors that they can put up with. To make information sharing 
effective, the variance of information errors should be kept very much within the 
variance of end-customer demands. The following propositions further characterize 
the behavior of impact of information errors.  
Proposition 2.1 The benefit of information sharing (cost savings as a result of 
information sharing) is concave decreasing in the standard deviation of information 
errors.  
Proof: The benefit of information sharing (savings in the supplier’s cost) is calculated 
as       22 11   TTZpTh
T
CC ssIENI . 
In order to see the relationship between the cost savings and the error variability, let us 
define a term   22 1   TTK . 
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K  is concave decreasing in   for 0 .                                                                     ■ 
  represents the magnitude of information errors. From proposition 2.1, when the 
magnitude of errors is large (small), the detrimental impact of a marginal increase is 
larger (smaller). Thus, the importance of analyzing information errors must be 
emphasized in practice because large magnitude of errors can cause a lot of damage to 
a supply chain. 
In order to look at how the other parameters influence the impact of information 
errors, we compare the supplier’s costs under information sharing with and without 
errors. The difference in the supplier’s costs indicates the reduction in the benefit of 
information sharing due to information errors. Let S  denote the impact of information 
errors and define a relative term 
 

 
22 1T
C
CC
S
IS
ISIE  which stands 
for the relative cost increase due to errors in information sharing. 
Proposition 2.2 The detrimental impact of information errors (on reducing the benefit 
of information sharing) decreases as the standard deviation of end-customer demands 
increases. 
Proof:      01
1
222
2
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When the end-customer demands are less variable, the distorted demand due to 
information errors may be very different from the real demand compared to the case of 
more variable demands. Therefore, for industries with relatively less-variable demands, 
dealing with information errors should be one of the major issues. Besides, we can 
acquire further insights on how the retailer’s order interval T  affects the impact of 
information errors. 
Proposition 2.3 The detrimental impact of information errors (on reducing the benefit 
of information sharing to the supplier) increases with respect to the retailer’s order 
interval T. 
Proof: Let 
 
22 )1(
)(
T
Tg  for an integer T . 
0
)1(
)()1(
2222
 
 TT
TgTg  for any integer 0T .           ■ 
The impact of information errors increases with T  since more errors are included in 
the information when the retailer places orders less frequently. 
2.4. Computational results 
The simulation study is designed to confirm the analytical results for a larger set of 
demand distributions. We obtain the supplier costs of the three models (Model NI, 
Model IS, and Model IE) via simulation with an IPA (Infinitesimal Perturbation 
Analysis) procedure (Glasserman and Tayur (1995)) to compute optimal order up-to 
levels. It is assumed that the retailer uses an (R,T) inventory policy, and we found the 
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optimal (R,T) values for the retailer by comparing each average retailer cost under 
each optimal order-up-to level R  given T  (Rao (2003)).  Six demand distributions are 
considered: Normal (20,3), Normal (20,5), Normal (20,7), Erlang (4,5), Erlang (2,10), 
and Exponential (20) (=Erlang (1,20)). The demands are always non-negative 
(truncated at 0 if needed). Since we assume i.i.d. demands, the demand variability is 
constant throughout the entire periods for each distribution. The following parameters 
are used for simulation: ( rh =1, rp =3, sh =1) for all the experiments; sp = {3, 6, 9, 12, 
15};  T = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6};  ={ 2.0 , 4.0 , 6.0 , 8.0 ,  , 2.1 , 4.1 , 6.1 } 
where   is the standard deviation of information errors and   is the standard 
deviation of the end-customer demand. Instead of the fixed cost, we vary the retailer’s 
order interval. These parameters generate 1200 combinations and, for each 
combination, we compute the supplier costs of the three models (Model NI, Model IS, 
and Model IE).  
Note that we get censored distributions of demand information by generating only 
nonnegative information. That is, during simulation, whenever demand information 
turns out to be negative, we discard it and generate another one. This way we can 
recognize the impact of normality assumption of errors. This restriction helps more on 
erlang distributions that have more chances to be negative than normal distributions. 
The interesting finding is that these simulation results almost fully support the 
analytical results obtained under the assumption of allowing negative information. 
That is, the possibility of negative information in the model does not significantly 
affect the impact of information errors on the supplier’s cost.  
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Also, as a result of simulation, we observe that most properties analyzed in section 
2.3 hold not only for i.i.d. normal demand distribution but also for i.i.d. erlang demand 
distributions.  
 
Figure 2.2: Benefit of information sharing with errors by various demand distributions 
Figure 2.2 depicts the average cost savings from information sharing ( IENI CC  ) 
under various demand distributions with respect to the magnitude of information 
errors as a ratio of standard deviation of errors to standard deviation of end-customer 
demands. The decrease of average cost savings with respect to the magnitude of 
information errors shows concavity as verified in proposition 2.1. That is, as the 
magnitude of information errors increases, information sharing becomes much less 
valuable and the marginal impact of errors increases. As theorem 2.1 says, there is no 
more benefit of information sharing when the variability of errors equals the 
variability of end-customer demands, and this critical point is also confirmed by 
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simulation results for i.i.d. normal demands. For i.i.d. erlang demands, the critical 
point is a little bit larger because we use the censored distribution of erroneous 
information. Dealing with only nonnegative demand information makes the error 
variability smaller than it is supposed to be. Still, it does not change the fact that the 
variance of information errors should be at least within the demand variance to make 
information sharing useful.  
The following measure is defined to observe the relationships between the impact of 
information errors and the parameters varied in the simulation setting: 
Impact of information errors (%) = 
IS
ISIE
C
CC 100 . 
This measure implies the relative cost increase caused by moving from information 
sharing without errors (Model IS) to information sharing with errors (Model IE).  
 
Figure 2.3: Impact of information errors with respect to retailer order interval 
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Figure 2.3 shows the average impact of information errors with respect to the retailer’s 
order interval T . For all simulated distributions, information errors have greater effect 
when the retailer’s order interval T  is longer. 
2.5. Investment to reduce information errors 
If a supply chain can reduce the magnitude of information errors to benefit sufficiently 
from information sharing, to what extent should it invest in the effort? Suppose that 
the standard deviation of information errors   becomes  I exp  when we invest 
I  in an effort to reduce information errors; we want to know what the optimal 
investment level would be. Although we do not have empirical evidence to support the 
function for error reduction, this assumption captures the following desired property: 
the standard deviation of information errors remains the same as   with no 
investment, while it approaches 0 if we invest a significantly large amount. A proper 
choice of   makes the assumption practically reasonable. To find the optimal 
investment *I , the following problem needs to be solved. 
     IICCMaximize IEIE   exp  
where )(IEC = the supplier cost when the standard deviation of information errors is 
 .  
Proposition 2.4 The optimal investment *I  is decreasing in  , increasing in the 
supplier’s unit penalty cost sp , increasing in standard deviation of information errors 
 , decreasing in standard deviation of end-customer demands  , and increasing in 
retailer’s order interval T , respectively. 
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Proof:        
Recall that         22 11   TZpTh
T
C ssIE . 
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This is concave in I , so the optimal investment which maximizes the cost savings is 
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i. As   increases, a relatively smaller investment is needed to reduce the same 
magnitude of information errors.   will be determined by the level of 
techniques to reduce information errors. If the technique is very efficient, even 
a small amount of investment can lead to a significant reduction in the 
standard deviation of information errors. For practical analysis, we can 
specify an adequate   by comparing an input (investment) and an output 
(reduction in the standard deviation of information errors) of a certain 
technology.  
ii. As the supplier’s unit penalty cost increases, the term    ZpTh ss   where 
  sss pThpZ  1  increases as well (Chen and Lee (2009)). The optimal 
investment *I  is increasing in the term    ZpTh ss   and thus increasing in 
the supplier’s unit penalty cost sp . Sharing precise information is especially 
important to the supplier if he incurs huge cost when he cannot meet the 
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retailer’s request. Therefore, one might need to invest much more on reducing 
information errors in this case. 
iii. The efforts to reduce the magnitude of information errors will pay off more 
when the variability of errors is large in the first place. Therefore, the optimal 
investment is increasing in the variability of information errors, though the 
marginal increase is decreasing.  
iv. When the end-customer demands are more variable, sharing demand 
information will help the supplier a lot in cost savings and the negative impact 
of information errors will be relatively minor. Therefore, the optimal 
investment to diminish errors decreases as the demand variability increases.  
v. Finally, there is more need for error reduction when the retailer’s order 
interval is longer. As analyzed before, the impact of information errors 
increases as the retailer’s order interval T  increases because errors 
accumulate for  1T  periods. Thus, we need to raise the investment to 
reduce information errors especially for longer order intervals. 
Figures 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show the computational results regarding optimal 
investment under the same simulation setting as in Section 2.4 only adding the 
variation of  ={0.5, 1, 1.5, 2}. From these figures, proposition 2.4 is also validated 
for i.i.d. erlang demand distributions. 
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Figure 2.4: Optimal investment with respect to alpha 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Optimal investment with respect to supplier unit penalty cost 
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Figure 2.6: Optimal investment w.r.t. the ratio of error variability to demand variability 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Optimal investment with respect to retailer order interval 
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2.6. Implications and conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analyzed the impact of information errors on the benefit of 
information sharing. Though it is not surprising that existence of errors reduces the 
benefit of information sharing, it is not obvious how the supply chain costs are 
affected by information errors and what factors influence on the impact of errors. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study to rigorously quantify the behavior of supply 
chain performance regarding information sharing with errors. Given that information 
sharing is very costly, it is necessary to ensure that the benefit is greater than the cost. 
By comparing the supplier’s costs with and without information errors, we have 
verified the following properties which have managerial implications. 
First, as the variability of information errors increases, the benefit of information 
sharing decreases in a concave manner. This implies that more-variable information 
errors have bigger impacts on reducing the benefit of information sharing than less-
variable information errors. Thus, we may accept small magnitude of errors in shared 
information, but large magnitude of errors will significantly harm supply chain 
performance. We observe that the information has no more value when the variability 
of information errors exceeds the variability of end-customer demands, making 
information sharing worse than not doing the practice. Information technology does 
not have to be perfect, but the errors due to the system should be at least within the 
variability of demands. This can be a critical point in judging whether the firm uses a 
certain information technology. 
Moreover, the detrimental impact of information errors tends to increase as the 
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variability of end-customer demands decreases. Therefore, information sharing should 
be more carefully adopted for industries with relatively less-variable end-customer 
demands. As the retailer’s order interval increases, the detrimental impact of 
information errors increases as well, because more errors are included in longer order 
intervals. 
Finally, we have discussed how much one should invest in alleviating information 
errors. If the cost cutback achieved by reducing the magnitude of errors outweighs the 
investment amount, it is worthwhile to try. A crucial thought would be how to quantify 
error reduction by investment. The optimal investment amount is determined by cost 
parameters, error variability, demand variability, and retailer order intervals. It is 
increasing in the supplier’s unit penalty cost, increasing in standard deviation of 
information errors, decreasing in standard deviation of end-customer demands, and 
increasing in retailer’s order interval, respectively. 
Efforts to improve supply chain performance such as information sharing do not 
always guarantee success, not because the purposes are insufficient but because 
uncontrollable errors may arise due to imperfect systems. Therefore, we should take 
into account the possibilities that the performance may not reach the expected goal. 
This study, by analyzing supply chain behavior with inaccurate information sharing, 
provides managerial implications for what circumstances are favorable to information 
sharing and what amount of investment is desirable to reduce information errors. 
Future research may extend this concept to investigate the impact of possible errors on 
other practices for supply chain improvement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INVENTORY CONTROL WHEN SELLING TO HUMAN NEWSVENDORS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
We are living in a fast-changing business world where values of certain products 
diminish rapidly from the time they launch. The typical examples of such products 
include electronics that requires advanced technology and fashion apparels that can be 
only in style for a single selling season. The question about how much to prepare stock 
for these products with obsolescence is developed to a well-known newsvendor model 
in operations management research. The newsvendor model obtained its name from a 
newsvendor who has to decide how many newspapers should be ordered to maximize 
his profit, since too many orders end up with worthless leftovers and too few orders 
lead to foregone profits. 
Newsvendor problems have been extensively studied with many extensions (Khouja 
(1999)). Most papers focus on the newsvendor problem only for retailers facing 
random demands rather than considering a supplier or a manufacturer who sells 
products to those retailers. This chapter studies inventory control for a supplier or a 
manufacturer when her customers deal with newsvendor problems. For example, 
suppose a manufacturer produces fashion apparel items and sells them to local retail 
stores that manage a newsvendor problem for every selling season. These retail stores 
must place an order with the manufacturer well in advance because the lead time from 
order placement to receipt of products is usually long for apparel industry (Fisher and 
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Raman (1996)). Considering that fashion products are time-sensitive, the manufacturer 
needs to prepare for stocks on hand to immediately meet the retailers’ demands. Some 
apparel firms such as Nike place orders with original equipment manufacturers 
(OEMs) who must forecast the customer demand and produce the items before they 
receive orders. 
Most newsvendor-type retailers in many industries including electronics, apparel, or 
food chain, etc. have suppliers. However, as mentioned earlier, there have not been 
many studies on the supply chain context. One of the reasons lies on an assumption of 
perfect rationality that retailers will always order an optimal quantity that is a well-
known newsvendor solution, in which case there is no uncertainty in the supplier’s 
stock decision. 
However, recent experimental research in the newsvendor setting revealed that 
retailers do not make optimal inventory decisions. Experiments conducted by 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) covering thirty periods reported that there is a 
significant tendency of anchoring on the mean demand and that subjects choose a 
stocking level that is between the mean demand and the optimal quantity. They also 
found weak support for a chasing demand pattern. As follow-up papers, Bolton and 
Katok (2008) and Bostian et al. (2008) confirmed the experimental results of 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) and further studied the effect of learning. Benzion et al. 
(2008) showed that normal demand distribution generates the similar results to those 
under uniform demand distribution and that the order quantity is affected by previous-
round results. While these non-optimal behavioral patterns are acknowledged to be 
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robust, there has been no research that studies their impact on supply chain 
performance. 
When retailers make non-optimal inventory decisions for a newsvendor situation, 
what should be the inventory control strategy of a supplier who sells the products to 
the retailers? Will understanding retailers’ behaviors help the supplier manage 
inventories? This study investigates whether a supplier could improve her inventory 
decision by incorporating the retailers’ behaviors in the decision making processes. 
We (i) develop mathematical models for the newsvendor decision maker; (ii) 
estimate the parameters using data from experiments with human subjects; (iii) 
determine the demand distribution the supplier faces; and ultimately (iv) observe the 
cost savings that the supplier achieves by incorporating these behavioral tendencies 
into her decision making. 
Using the data from our own experiments, we estimate the possible reduction in 
supplier costs and determine the factors that significantly affect it. From the data 
showing an obvious demand-chasing pattern, we observe that a supplier can save 
considerable inventory costs by taking into account those retailers’ behavioral 
tendencies. The amount of cost savings depends on the characteristics of the data, and 
it should be studied how we can determine the types of retailers’ behaviors. We 
propose a model assuming that retailers are mean-anchoring with probability p , 
demand-chasing with probability r , and random with probability  rp 1 . Values 
of these probabilities might work as a clue to decide the retailers’ behavioral 
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tendencies. If p  or r  is large enough, this model can be used by a supplier to estimate 
the distribution of the demand she faces.  
We also propose a useful methodology for the supplier to estimate the demand 
distribution: Bayesian regression is an appropriate way of estimating model 
parameters when the sample size is small. A supplier can estimate the distribution of 
each retailer’s order quantities and compute the potential inventory cost by Bayesian 
regression analysis. 
In addition, by analyzing experimental results, we discovered that considering 
individual behaviors helps the supplier estimate the demand distribution better than 
considering aggregate random behaviors of retailers, which is expected intuitively as 
well. From the additional experiments, we obtained an insight about the effect of end-
customer demands’ variance: when the demand variance is larger, the supplier gets 
more benefit from the information about retailers’ behaviors. Besides, we believe there 
are many more interesting and valuable research ideas regarding this subject. 
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we review some relevant 
literatures and point out the contribution of this study. Section 3.3 describes a supply-
chain setup and five models used in this research. In Section 3.4, we analyze the 
possible cost savings from understanding retailers’ behaviors with our own 
experimental data. Section 3.5 discusses several issues regarding the findings of this 
research. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter and suggests future research directions. 
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3.2. Literature review 
Behavioral operations management is a relatively new research field with significant 
potentials. Recently, researchers are paying increasing attentions to behavioral studies 
in operations management area, not only because they realize human factors should be 
considered to explain real-world phenomena but also because behavioral 
experimentation and mathematical modeling complement each other (Bendoly et al. 
(2006)). 
A group of behavioral papers are summarized in several review papers such as 
Boudreau et al. (2003), Loch and Wu (2005), and Bendoly et al. (2006). Further, Gino 
and Pisano (2008) guide some future research directions, and Bendoly et al. (2010) 
review related knowledge for research in behavioral operations. Particularly for supply 
chain management, some literatures emphasize the importance of behavioral research 
(Tokar (2010), Bachrach and Bendoly (2011), Knemeyer and Naylor (2011), Siemsen 
(2011)). Yet, there are relatively fewer papers about behavioral operations of supply 
chains, which are limited to only couple of issues such as bullwhip effect (Croson and 
Donohue (2006)) and contracting (Katok et al. (2008), Katok and Wu (2009), 
Kalkanci et al. (2011)). There are very few papers that incorporate human behavioral 
effects into supply chain operational performance. Kalkanci et al. (2011) observes via 
human experiments that the simple price-only contract is more efficient and more 
profitable to a supply chain than the theoretically superior quantity-discount contract. 
However, especially in newsvendor arena, this study is the only one that investigates 
the effect of behavioral tendencies on supply chain performance.  
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For the topic of newsvendor problems, some researchers have discussed important 
issues about behavioral operations, though not in a supply chain context. Schweitzer 
and Cachon (2000) discover that human newsvendors do not make optimal inventory 
decisions and explain the behaviors by anchoring and insufficient adjustment 
heuristics. Gavirneni and Isen (2010) study behavioral aspects of newsvendor 
inventory decisions through verbal protocol analysis. Benzion et al. (2010) observe 
that human subjects do not make superior optimal newsvendor inventory decisions 
when they know demand distribution, compared to when they do not. We refer to 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) to use their heuristics as a way of explaining retailers’ 
behavioral tendencies, but still the focus of our study is on an entire supply chain: how 
the behavioral tendencies affect supply chain performance. 
The methodology used in this study is also relatively novel in operations 
management area, not to mention it is the most suitable way to analyze the 
experimental data. Azoury and Miyaoka (2009) state that a Bayesian approach to 
demand modeling is especially appropriate in an environment of high uncertainty with 
little historical data. By using Bayesian regression method when analyzing the 
experimental data, we were able to estimate the model parameters to determine the 
distribution of retailers’ order quantities so that a supplier can predict her inventory 
cost. Interested readers may refer to Gelman et al. (2004) and Congdon (2007) for 
more details about Bayesian regression analysis. 
To sum up, the academic contribution of this study can be pointed out as follows. 
First, this is the first that studies the effect of retailers’ irrational inventory decisions 
on supply chain performance. Second, this also contributes to the newsvendor 
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literatures by considering behavioral aspects of newsvendor decisions in a supply 
chain context. Third, this study uses Bayesian regression analysis which is an effective 
methodology to compute the possible cost savings as well as to propose a way to 
determine the individual decision-maker’s behaviors or forecast demand distribution 
based on order history. 
3.3. Models 
3.3.1. Setup 
We consider a supplier selling a single product to N  independent retailers at a unit 
wholesale price of W  per unit. She procures the product of C  per unit and if she can 
sell it to a retailer, makes a margin of CW  . On the other hand, if the unit is left over 
due to a low demand from the retailers, she foregoes the C  dollars spent in acquiring 
it. Each retailer, in turn, faces random (uniformly distributed between 0  and U ) 
demands from end-customers and must make a newsvendor decision about how much 
inventory to acquire. The retailers acquire the product at W  per unit and sell it to the 
end-customers at P  per unit. Unsatisfied demands at the retailers are assumed to be 
lost. Unsatisfied demand at the supplier is satisfied via expediting which costs the 
supplier eC  per unit. The retailers will always receive their whole order and thus in 
effect face uncapacitated replenishment. Any excess inventories at the retailers and the 
supplier are salvaged at no additional revenue at the end of the period. The sequence 
of events in each period is as follows:  
1. The supplier decides her stocking level. The production capacity is infinite. 
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2. The retailers place their orders with the supplier and receive them from the 
supplier in full. If the supplier does not have enough inventory to meet all of 
the retailers’ demands, she will use an expediting process to immediately 
acquire additional inventory and ships them to the retailer. 
3. The retailers observe the end-customer demands and satisfy as much as 
possible from on-hand inventory. Unsatisfied end-customer demands at the 
retailers are lost. 
4. Excess inventories at the supplier and the retailers are salvaged at no additional 
revenue. 
The system is a repeated newsvendor problem with the retailers and the supplier 
making decisions that maximize their own expected profits. 
3.3.2. Retailer and supplier behavior 
The retailer’s stocking level decision is one of a newsvendor with infinite capacity and 
thus the optimal solution is well known. The information needed to solve for a 
newsvendor problem consists of an overage cost ( oC ) associated with every unit of 
unsold inventory, an underage cost ( uC ) associated with every unit of demand lost due 
to lack of inventory, and demand distribution (  F ). Given this information, the 
optimal purchasing quantity can be computed as  
uo
u
CC
CF 
1 . Under our setup, the 
underage cost is WP   and the overage cost is W  for retailers. 
Let us first consider that all retailers behave optimally. The optimal order quantity is  
UPWP   and since the problem renews in every period, the order quantity would be 
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the same in all periods. The total demand seen by the supplier in each period is 
NUPWP  . Since there is no randomness in the demand seen by the supplier, her 
stocking level decision is trivial and her optimal profit is   NUCW PWP   . There is 
no additional cost related to inventory decision of the supplier. 
On the other hand, if retailers behave non-optimally, they do not make optimal 
decisions and demonstrate significant variability in their order quantities. This 
variability necessitates the supplier to make an appropriate newsvendor decision. The 
total demand seen by the supplier is equivalent to the sum of all retailers’ order 
quantities. It is reasonable to assume that each retailer’s order quantity is normally 
distributed because normal distribution is most commonly used for stochastic 
variables. Su (2008) found that the boundedly rational newsvendor’s order quantity 
follows a truncated normal distribution for uniformly distributed end-customer 
demands. 
The supplier’s stock decision is affected by how she determines the distribution of 
the retailers’ order quantities. We develop five models based on different assumptions 
on retailers’ behaviors. For each model, we define the retailer decision making process 
at an individual level and characterize the resulting demand faced by the supplier. 
Human retailers will behave all differently, so it is natural to model the retailers’ 
behaviors at an individual level rather than in aggregate. Following notations are used 
through all models: 
itQ : order quantity placed by retailer i  at time t  
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*Q : optimal order quantity for retailers (optimal newsvendor solution) 
td  : observed end-customer demand at time t  
Model R: The supplier assumes that all retailers’ order quantities are random. 
Each retailer’s order quantity can be modeled as: 
R
it
RR
it QQ   *  
where Rit  is the error term with distribution  2)(,0 RiNormal  . Then, the demand 
seen by the supplier is 

 

N
i
R
i
RQNNormal
1
2)(*,  . 
Model IR: The supplier assumes that each retailer’s order quantity follows 
normal distribution with individual mean and variance. 
Each retailer’s order quantity can be modeled as: 
IR
it
IR
i
IR
it QQ   *  
where IRit  is the error term with distribution  2)(,0 IRiNormal  . Then, the demand 
seen by the supplier is 

 

N
i
IR
i
N
i
IR
i QNormal
1
2
1
)(*,  . 
Model M: The supplier assumes that the retailers have mean-anchoring 
tendencies. 
Retailers anchor on the mean demand ( 2U ) and insufficiently adjust towards the 
optimal order quantity ( *Q ).This is one of the heuristics suggested by Schweitzer and 
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Cachon (2000), and it explains well the pattern of order quantities between mean 
demand and optimal order quantity. We model this mean-anchoring behavior as 
follows: 
  MitMiUMiMit QaaQ  *2 1  
where Mia  is an individual-specific parameter representing the magnitude of the 
mean-anchoring tendencies, and Mit  is the error term with distribution 
 2)(,0 MiNormal  . In this case, the demand seen by the supplier is 
      
N
i
M
i
N
i
M
i
UM
i QaaNormal
1
2
1
*
2 )(,1  . 
Model D: The supplier assumes that the retailers have a tendency to chase the 
previous demand. 
Retailers anchor on a prior order quantity ( 1, tiQ ) and adjust towards prior demand 
( 1td ).This is another heuristic suggested by Schwetizer and Cachon (2000). We 
model this demand-chasing behavior as follows: 
  DitDtiDitDiDit QbdbQ   1,1 1  
where Dib  is an individual-specific parameter representing the magnitude of the 
demand-chasing tendencies, and  Dit  is the error term with distribution 
 2)(,0 DiNormal  . In this case, the demand seen by the supplier is 
       
N
i
D
i
N
i
D
ti
D
it
D
i QbdbNormal
1
2
1
1,1 )(,1  . 
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Model B: The supplier assumes that the retailers are both mean-anchoring and 
demand-chasing.  
If each retailer has a mean-anchoring tendency with individual probability ip  and a 
demand-chasing tendency with individual probability ir , we can model this behavior 
as follows: 
        BitBiBitiBitBiBiBiUBiBiBit QrpQbdbrQaapQ   *1,1*2 111 . 
where Bit  is the error term with distribution  2)(,0 BiNormal  . Then, the demand 
seen by the supplier is 
             
N
i
B
i
N
i
B
i
B
iti
B
it
B
i
B
i
B
i
UB
i
B
i QrpQbdbrQaapNormal
1
2
1
*
1,1
*
2 )(,111  . 
Let S  denote the supplier’s stock level and D  denote the demand faced by the 
supplier, i.e., sum of all the retailers’ order quantities. Suppose this demand is 
normally distributed with mean   and standard deviation  . When the supplier’s 
stock level ( S ) is greater than or equal to the retailers’ demands ( D ), the supplier’s 
profit would be 
     DSCDCWS  . 
When the suppliers’ stock level ( S ) is less than the retailers’ demands ( D ), the 
supplier’s profit would be 
     SDCDCWS e  . 
Therefore, the supplier cost associated with inventory decision can be expressed as 
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      ][   SDCDSCESC e  
The optimal stock level *S  that minimizes this inventory cost is a well-known 
newsvendor solution, 
 
 
e
e
e
e
CC
C
CC
CFS






1
1*
  
where    is the standard normal distribution. 
The resulting supplier cost is 
      
e
e
CC
C
eCCSC 
 1*   
where    is the pdf of standard normal distribution. 
Note that the supplier is smart enough to solve the repeated newsvendor problem, 
that is, we assume perfect rationality for the supplier. Thus, if the supplier is able to 
properly estimate the demand distribution, she can compute the supplier’s inventory 
cost as it is determined by the standard deviation of her demand. 
3.4. Analysis 
The key question for the supplier to solve her repeated newsvendor problem is how to 
estimate the distribution of retailers’ order quantities given the retailers’ order history. 
As a way to obtain the retailers’ order history for our analysis, we conducted 
newsvendor experiments using human subjects. With the experimental data, we 
estimate the distribution of retailers’ order quantities by models under different 
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assumptions on retailers’ behaviors, and observe how much a supplier can improve the 
decision making process by incorporating information about retailers’ behaviors. 
The two experiments reveal that a supplier can significantly reduce her inventory 
cost by considering retailers’ behavioral tendencies. The second experiment not only 
validates the point but also examines the effect of end-customer demand variances. 
3.4.1. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 was done by recruiting 68 undergraduate students at Georgia State 
University. The participants were requested to make the inventory decisions for extra 
credits. They were able to obtain 3 points for a required course only when they 
finished all the 50 rounds. Since the three-point credit could change the grade (e.g. 
from grade B to grade A), it is a strong incentive to students. Each subject was 
assigned a computer and asked to decide the order quantity for each round. 
Information about the retail price, the purchasing price, and the demand distribution 
was shown on the screen. Except for the first round, the subjects were informed of the 
actual demand of the previous round and the resulting profit/loss they made in each 
round. The retail price is $1000, the purchasing price is $300, and demand is discrete 
and uniformly distributed between 1 and 20000. Because of its simplicity, uniform 
distribution is frequently used in the newsvendor experiments (Schwetizer and Cachon 
(2000), Bolton and Katok (2008), Bostian et al. (2008), Gavirneni and Xia (2009)). 
The results under normal demand distribution are usually not so different (Benzion et 
al. (2008)). The newsvendor solution (optimal order quantity) of our experiment is 
14000. However, similarly as shown in several experiments from other articles, the 
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subjects did not order 14000 units most of the time. We used only 60 subjects’ 
answers for analysis after excluding unreliable data. Figure 3.1 depicts the average 
order quantity across subjects along with the actual demand for each round.  
 
Figure 3.1: Experimental data – Experiment 1 
Unlike other literatures, there is no “pull-to-center” effect in our data from Experiment 
1, that is, the average order quantities do not always lie between mean demand 
(10000) and optimal order quantity (14000), only in 19 rounds out of 50 rounds (38%). 
Of all the decisions (3000 decisions), 31.23% of order quantities are between mean 
demand and optimal order quantity. However, clearly, we can see a very strong pattern 
of chasing demands. Of all the decisions excluding the first round (2940 decisions), 
75.24% changed the order quantities across rounds in the direction of previous 
demand, 10.99% changed the order quantity away from previous demand, and 13.77% 
didn’t change the order quantity. 
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We carried out a Bayesian regression analysis to estimate the model parameters 
described in section 3.2. Bayesian regression is widely used especially in marketing 
research due to its powerful ability to analyze experimental data even when the sample 
size is relatively small. As we observe individual retailers’ ordering behaviors, 
Bayesian regression would provide the best estimation for model parameters. Publicly 
available Windows-based software WinBUGS (Windows Bayesian inference Using 
Gibbs Sampling) is used for Bayesian regression on our data. WinBUGS is developed 
for the Bayesian analysis of complex statistical models using Markov chain Monte 
Carlo methods. The results of Bayesian regression estimation are summarized in Table 
3.1. 
Table 3.1: Parameter estimation - Experiment 1 
 SD of 
demand 
Average values 
  a  b  p r    
Model R 39062.91 0.629     5043.00
Model IR 38127.00 0.628     4784.05
Model M 41109.61  0.890    5177.60
Model D 30117.76   0.601   3647.46
Model B 28927.66  0.703 0.676 0.241 0.691 3516.63
 
We provide average values of each parameter, but all the individual-specific 
parameters are available upon request. Also, we can provide the distribution of each 
individual-specific parameters, as Bayesian regression estimates parameters with 
probabilities unlike other regression methods. 
Remember that the supplier’s inventory cost is determined by the standard deviation 
of the demand the supplier sees. Therefore, we need to compare the standard deviation 
of the suppliers’ demand by models, which is computed as follows.  
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where m  indicates Model R, IR, M, D, and B, respectively, as far as each model 
estimates the demand distribution properly. 
We define a performance measure for cost comparisons as: 
Improvement of Model m  (%) = 100  (Estimated cost of Model R – Estimated 
cost of Model m ) / Estimated cost of Model R 
This measure implies how much the supplier’ inventory cost is saved by estimating 
demand distribution with Model m , compared to assuming that retailers’ orders are 
random in aggregate. Table 3.2 shows the Improvement of each model. 
Table 3.2: Improvement - Experiment 1 
 Improvement (%) 
Model IR 2.396 
Model M -5.239 
Model D 22.899 
Model B 25.946 
 
The highest Improvement, about 26%, is obtained when each retailer is assumed to be 
both mean-anchoring and demand-chasing with individual probabilities. The cost 
reduction when all retailers are assumed to be demand-chasing is considerable as well 
at 22.90%. However, assuming all retailers are mean-anchoring turns out to rather 
increase the supplier’s inventory cost. 
The plausible explanation is that our data from Experiment 1 presents obvious 
demand-chasing behaviors, but not clear mean-anchoring behaviors. In other words, if 
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a model explains the data (order history) well, a supplier can save significant 
inventory cost by estimating her demand with the model; but otherwise, it leads to a 
worse outcome.  
The fit of models to the data can be evaluated by a measure, DIC (Deviance 
Information Criterion), provided in Table 3.3 for our data. 
Table 3.3: DIC - Experiment 1 
 DIC 
Model R 59669.4 
Model IR 59147.0 
Model M 59680.8 
Model D 56083.3 
Model B 55894.8 
 
The DIC is defined in analogy with the AIC (Akaike’s Information Criterion). So, 
models with smaller DIC provide a better fit. It gives a measure for how well each 
model fits the data and penalizes for the number of parameters, similar to the AIC. 
Therefore, among the five models we developed, Model B provides the best fit for the 
data as well as generates the lowest inventory cost. 
The important finding from the analysis is that a supplier can obtain significant cost 
savings if she incorporates the information about retailers’ ordering behaviors (e.g. 
mean-anchoring, demand-chasing, or both) into the decision making processes. It is 
notable that inappropriate assumption on retailers’ behaviors is of no use or leads to 
even worse performance. 
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3.4.2. Experiment 2 
Another experiment may enable more rigorous analysis as well as check whether our 
point applies to other data. 65 undergraduate students at Georgia State University were 
recruited for this experiment. They were requested to make simultaneous inventory 
decisions for two products for 50 periods given the information about end-customer 
demands and cost parameters.  
This time we consider two products with different demand distributions, in order to 
observe the effect of demand variances. For product #1, the demand is discrete and 
uniformly distributed from 1 to 20000, and for product #2, the demand is discrete and 
uniformly distributed from 1 to 500. For both products, the selling price is $10 and the 
purchasing price is $3. These are also repeated newsvendor problems for each retailer. 
The optimal order quantity should be 14000 for product #1, and 350 for product #2. 
We had to select only 23 subjects’ responses that are suitable for analysis for both 
products.  
The experimental results are shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 by plotting the 
average order quantities across subjects in each period.  
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Figure 3.2: Experimental data - Experiment 2, product #1 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Experimental data - Experiment 2, product #2 
 
Similarly to Experiment 1, the order quantities vary, and show a demand chasing 
pattern, though not as strong as that of Experiment 1. For product #1, of 1127 
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decisions excluding first-round decisions, 65.48% changed the order quantities in the 
direction of the previous demands, 9.58% changed the order quantities away from the 
previous demands, and 24.93% didn’t change the order amounts. For product #2, of 
1127 decisions, 62.64% changed the order quantities in the direction of the previous 
demands, 9.49% changed the order quantities away from the previous demands, and 
27.86% didn’t change the order amounts. Of all the 1150 decisions, 47.22% of order 
quantities lie between the mean demand (10000) and the optimal order quantity 
(14000) for product #1, and 36.61% of order quantities lie between the mean demand 
(250) and the optimal order quantity (350) for product #2, providing some evidence to 
a little bit more mean-anchoring tendency than Experiment 1.  
Again, we estimate the parameters of five models with the data by Bayesian 
regression, and the results are summarized in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. 
Table 3.4: Parameter estimation and DIC - Experiment 2, product #1 
Product #1 SD of 
demand 
Average values DIC 
  a  b  p r    
Model R 22852.14 0.735     4765.00 22744.0
Model IR 19837.87 0.735     3943.83 22029.0
Model M 22296.74  0.724    4290.09 22331.4
Model D 13556.61   0.519   2507.67 19380.6
Model B 12880.20  0.602 0.598 0.200 0.691 2352.72 19233.9
 
Table 3.5: Parameter estimation and DIC - Expeirment 2, product #2 
Product #2 SD of 
demand 
Average values DIC 
  a  b  p r    
Model R 579.82 0.690     120.90 14292.7
Model IR 512.48 0.690     102.82 13643.3
Model M 564.63  0.831    113.09 14037.6
Model D 397.69   0.502   74.36 12417.5
Model B 386.15  0.689 0.545 0.225 0.707 72.02 12340.7
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Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 provide the information about the cost improvement that can 
be achieved from estimating demand distribution with each model instead of assuming 
aggregate randomness. For both products, the estimated supplier cost is the lowest 
when the supplier assumes that retailers are both mean-anchoring and demand-chasing 
with their own probabilities (Model B). The supplier can save the cost by about 44% 
for product #1 and about 33% for product #2 compared to when she assumes random 
distribution for retailer orders in aggregate (Model R).  
Table 3.6: Improvement - Experiment 2, product #1 
 Improvement (%) 
Model IR 13.190 
Model M 2.430 
Model D 40.677 
Model B 43.637 
 
Table 3.7: Improvement - Experiment 2, product #2 
 Improvement (%) 
Model IR 11.613 
Model M 2.619 
Model D 31.412 
Model B 33.402 
 
From the two experiments, we observe that a supplier can improve her inventory 
decision significantly by assuming that retailers have anchoring tendencies. 
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3.5. Discussion 
In this section, we go over several issues worth to discuss from the experimental 
results. 
First, the decision making processes can be improved significantly by considering 
individual behaviors. In all cases, Model IR (assuming individual randomness) is 
superior to Model R (assuming aggregate randomness), implying that more precise 
forecasting is possible by understanding individual behaviors instead of aggregate 
behaviors. Particularly, the supplier benefits most from assuming that retailers are both 
mean-anchoring and demand-chasing with their individual probabilities (Model B). 
For our data, the supplier can save the inventory cost by as much as about 26% at least. 
The magnitude of cost savings depends on the data, but it is certain that the 
information about retailers’ behavioral tendencies helps the supplier’s inventory 
decision. Model B provides the best fit to all data in terms of DIC, that is, considering 
both mean-anchoring and demand-chasing behavioral tendencies explains the given 
order history well. 
Second, we need to precisely identify the retailers’ behavioral tendencies. Our 
experimental results show that assuming only mean-anchoring retailers may lead to 
even worse performance for the supplier than assuming just random orders, when the 
data does not tell a clear sign of mean-anchoring tendencies. On the other hand, 
assuming only demand-chasing retailers improves the suppliers’ inventory decision 
quite considerably, as the data shows a strong demand-chasing pattern. Therefore, we 
might say the retailers in our data are demand-chasing. It is not surprising that Model 
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B generates the best outcome, as Model M and Model D are its trivial cases. Still, it is 
important to identify the retailer’s behavioral tendencies because it will affect the 
usefulness of this approach. 
We need to think of how we can determine whether the retailers are mean-
anchoring, demand-chasing, or neither. For the mean-anchoring tendency, we may 
observe whether the average order quantities are usually between the mean demand 
and the optimal order quantity. In our data, out of 50 rounds, 19 average order 
quantities (38%) lie between the mean demand and the optimal order quantity for 
Experiment 1, 28 (56%) for product #1 in Experiment 2, and 21 (42%) for product #2 
in Experiment 2. For the demand-chasing tendency, we may count how many times 
the average order quantity changes towards the previous demand instead of away from 
it. In our data, for 49 rounds excluding the first round, most average order quantities 
change toward the previous demand: 45 (91.8%) for Experiment 1, 46 (93.9%) for 
product #1 in Experiment 2, 41 (83.7%) for product #2 in Experiment 2. Another 
possible method to determine retailer’s behaviors might be using the probability 
parameters of Model B. In all experiments, the sum of average parameters p  and r  is 
around 0.9, and that may be the reason why Model B improves the supplier’s 
inventory decision so significantly. If retailers’ behaviors are ambiguous in both 
mean-anchoring and demand-chasing, the sum of average probability parameters p  
and r  might be relatively low and Model B might not improve the decision that much. 
In such case, we can still use the Model B as a tool to identify the retailer’s behaviors. 
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Third, Experiment 2 was designed to observe the effect of demand variance as well 
as to check validity of the result of Experiment 1. To examine whether individual 
retailers have a consistent behavioral tendency on ordering two different products, we 
compared individual-specific model parameters through two-sample t test. As a result, 
we cannot find an evidence pointing that the set of model parameters are not different 
across two products with different demand variances. Although, it seems that the 
information about retailers’ behavioral tendencies is more useful when the end-
customer demands are more variable. It is probably because the random assumption 
makes more significant difference from anchoring-behavior assumption when the end-
customer demands are more variable. 
Fourth, it is notable that the experimental data of this study shows a very strong 
demand-chasing behavioral tendency unlike those in other existing literatures. A 
plausible explanation might be that the subjects in our experiments are undergraduate 
students who have not been trained for newsvendor problems. Still, it does not cloud 
the fact that the information about retailers’ behaviors improves the supplier’s 
inventory decision, considering that neither the MBA who have learned the 
newsvendor model make optimal decisions nor the training improves the inventory 
decisions (Schweitzer and Cachon (2000)). What circumstances lead to retailers’ 
demand-chasing tendencies can be an interesting topic for future research. 
Lastly, the Bayesian regression analysis used to estimate model parameters in this 
study can be a new methodology for forecasting demand given the historical data. 
There are many ways to forecast demands, including subjective methods such as 
Delphi method and computational methods such as linear regression. Bayesian 
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regression is especially useful for individual-specific parameter estimation, even with 
small-size samples, and thus it would capture individual human behaviors effectively. 
As we only considered two behavioral tendencies (mean-anchoring and demand-
chasing), there is still room for model improvement. There may be a better model that 
explains human newsvendors’ behaviors well than Model B and searching for such a 
model merits another future study. 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates whether a supplier can improve inventory decisions by 
incorporating retailers’ behavioral tendencies into the decision making processes when 
the retailers make non-optimal inventory decisions under a repeated newsvendor 
setting. By Bayesian regression analysis with experimental data, we were able to 
estimate the demand distribution a supplier faces and thereby compute the supplier’s 
possible cost savings. As a result, we observe a significant improvement in the 
supplier’s inventory decision if she estimates the demand distribution with a model 
that captures the anchoring tendencies instead of assuming aggregate randomness. As 
the model selection relies much on the data, it is an important task to determine 
whether the retailers are mean-anchoring, demand-chasing, both, or neither. In 
addition, we observe that the information about retailers’ behaviors is more beneficial 
for the supplier when the end-customer demands are more variable. It is certain that 
more precise information on the data (order history) will lead to a better inventory 
decision for suppliers. The information includes the retailers’ behavioral tendencies, 
individual-specific order behaviors, and the variability of end-customer demands, etc. 
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This study contributes to behavioral operations management literatures by focusing 
on the behavioral effect on supply chain performance in newsvendor inventory 
decisions. Further, it could be a first step towards future research with huge potentials. 
First, it is important to find the best model that describes retailers’ behaviors. There 
may be other behavioral tendencies than mean-anchoring and demand-chasing. Also, 
we can think of a reverse situation for sourcing decision. That is, if suppliers are 
irrational and a retailer is rational, the retailer might enhance the sourcing decision by 
understanding suppliers’ non-optimal behavioral tendencies. As mentioned earlier, 
Bayesian regression analysis may serve as a useful methodology for demand 
forecasting, with its powerful capability to explain individual-specific data. Finally, 
we might consider the behavioral effect on supply chain performance for other 
operational problems not limited to newsvendor settings. For example, retailers may 
have a tendency to use more marketing promotions in certain selling seasons and 
suppliers may figure out retailers’ such behaviors to facilitate their inventory decisions. 
In all cases, the managerial implication would be that understanding supply-chain 
partner’s behaviors will improve the decision-making processes and that it is 
important to find a way for better understanding. 
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